راهبرد‌های بهینه‌ی دفاع از سامانه‌های حسّاس با وجود اهداف مجازی و رویکرد قابلیت اطمینان

نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 دانشجوی دکتری مهندسی صنایع، دانشگاه پیام نور تهران.

2 دانشیار، گروه مهندسی صنایع، دانشکده فنی و مهندسی، دانشگاه شاهد

3 دانشیار، گروه مهندسی صنایع، دانشگاه صنعتی مالک اشتر.

چکیده

امروزه دفاع از مناطق و منابع حسّاس، یکی از سیاست‌های کلان بقای دولت‌ها محسوب می‌شود و برای رسیدن به این هدف، به‌ کارگیری راهبرد‌های آگاهانه و مفید لازم و ضروری است. در این تحقیق، نمونه‌ سازی برای بهینه‌ یابی سرمایه‌ گذاری حفاظت از سامانه‌ های حساس در نظر گرفته شده است که در این سامانه‌ ها، مدافع با توجه به محدودیت‌های بودجه و فضای مورد نیاز برای تجهیزات دفاع، به دنبال حداقل‌‌سازی خسارت وارده از سوی مهاجم است در حالی ‌که هدف مهاجم تخریب حداکثری اهداف حساس با توجه به محدودیت‌های بودجه و وزن تجهیزات تهاجمی است. در این حالت، مدافع برای فریب‌ دادن مهاجم همچنین کاهش خسارت وارده به سامانه‌ های حساس، تعدادی اهداف مجازی (مصنوعی) ایجاد می‌کند و مهاجم در پی شناسایی نکردن قطعی این اهداف مجازی، برای تشخیص آنها به‌صورت احتمالی عمل می‌کند. به‌طور کلّی در این تحقیق، با توجه به احتمالات موجود در حمله‌ی موفق، قدرت تشخیص مهاجم در شناسایی اهداف مجازی، ساختار قابلیت اطمینان سامانه و رویکرد نظریه بازی‌ها در پیدا کردن نقطه‌ی ‌تعادل  ، یک نمونه‌ی برنامه‌ریزی غیرخطی برای تعیین میزان سرمایه‌ گذاری دفاع از تمامی زیرسامانه ‌ها ارائه شده است. در نهایت، نمونه‌ی ارائه ‌شده‌ی تحقیق برای یک  نمونه‌ی کاربردی استفاده می‌شود و نتایج نهایی آن، مورد تجزیه و تحلیل قرار می‌گیرد.

کلیدواژه‌ها


عنوان مقاله [English]

Optimal Strategies for Defense of Sensitive Systems with False Targets and Reliability Approach

نویسندگان [English]

  • Mahdi Rahimdel Meybodi 1
  • Amirhossein Amiri 2
  • Mahdi Karbasian 3
1 PhD Student of Industrial Engineering, Payam noor University, Tehran, Iran.
2 Associate Professor, Industrial Engineering Department, Faculty of Engineering, Shahed University, Tehran, Iran
3 Associate Professor, Industrial Engineering Department, Malek ashtar University of Technology, Tehran, Iran.
چکیده [English]

Nowadays, protecting sensitive resources is one of the most important issues by government politics. So, it is essential that government, in order to achieve this target, utilizes beneficial strategies. In this paper, investment optimization for the protection of sensitive systems has been investigated. Defender minimizes the expected damage with respect to budget and area restrictions of defense equipment. However, the attacker maximizes the expected damage of sensitive targets with respect to cost and weight restrictions of attack equipment. Besides, defender deploys false elements to reduce the probability of system and real target vulnerability. False and real elements cannot be distinguished by the attacker. But the attacker has some probability of successfully detecting false targets. The aim of this study is to determine the optimal strategies for defense of sensitive targets considering probability of a successful attack, attacker capability in detecting false targets, reliability block diagram and game theory approach. Finally, the presented model is illustrated for the case study and final findings are analyzed.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Sensitive systems
  • Reliability
  • Defense
  • False targets
  • Game Theory
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